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Using a sample of 321 textile and clothing companies for the years 1992 to 2010, this 
paper analyses the effect of quota phase-outs on firm-level efficiency in Pakistan following the 
end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). It highlights sectoral heterogeneity within the 
manufacturing industry as a result of MFA expiration. The empirical methodology uses the 
structural techniques proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996), and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) in 
order to take care of endogeneity in the estimation of production functions. The results differ 
for the two industries: MFA expiration lead to an increase in the average productivity of textile 
producing firms but a significant reduction in the mean productivity of clothing producers. We 
offer a number of explanations for this outcome, such as a change in the input and product mix, 
entry by non-exporters in the clothing sector, and sectoral differences in quality ladders. A 
number of crucial policy lessons can be drawn from the findings of this study. 
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The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) was the outcome of a decade-and-a-half of 
previous short-term agreements on the trade of textile and clothing (T&C) products 
amongst the developed and developing countries. Signed in 1974, the MFA enforced 
restrictions on exports by T&C exporters to developed countries by means of bilaterally 
negotiated quotas on textile products. Moreover, T&C products were excluded from 
multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). An important development of the 
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Uruguay Round (1994) was signing of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) 
which put to an end the MFA.  The ATC commenced the practice of integrating T&C 
products into GATT/WTO. The integration occurred over a period of ten years and across 
four phases starting from 1 January 1995. Importing countries were to include a certain 
portion of all T&C products covered by the ATC in each phase.
1
 The expiration of these 
quotas was expected to bring about a considerable reallocation of production and exports 
across countries. This paper evaluates the impact of the end of MFA on Pakistan’s T &C 
industry under the ATC.  More specifically, it evaluates the impact of quota relaxation 
and removal on firm productivity and total output in these industries. The goal of the 
study is to use the adjusted quota base within a given industry on the right-hand side of a 
regression with either firm productivity or firm output as the dependent variable.  The 
paper argues that the quota changes can be seen as exogenous from the firm’s 
perspective. Naturally, the topic is of general interest as well as from Pakistan’s point of 
view. The T&C industries are important in many developing countries, including 
Pakistan, and the ATC was one of the most important negotiated trade reforms for 
developing countries in the past 30 years.  The end of quota system, together with the 
mounting significance of the industry in its domestic market, leads us to analyse the 
efficiency issues related to Pakistan’s textile industry.  
What is of interest in the paper is the central issue of the relationship between 
these quota phase-outs and firm output and productivity.  Unlike most other studies in the 
literature, this paper investigates the liberalisation episode in a developed country, i.e. the 
United States in our case, and its consequences for firms in Pakistan. Furthermore, it 
highlights sectoral heterogeneity within the manufacturing industry of a developing 
country as an effect of MFA expiration. The textile sector is an important industry in 
Pakistan in terms of output, export value, foreign exchange earnings and employment.
2
 
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the export value in millions of U.S. dollars of several cotton 
and cotton manufactures from 1993 to 2011. Pakistan is the fourth largest producer of 
cotton in the world and does not have to rely on other countries for its raw materials. 
Moreover, labour costs in Pakistan are among the lowest in the world.
3
 T&C make up 
roughly 74 percent of total export  value. Tables 3 and 4 show the production and export 
of yarn and cloth, respectively, from 1971 to 1991. Government had taken steps to ensure 




1The particular products integrated in each phase were specific to importing countries but were 
determined by two rules [Brambilla, et al. (2007)]. To begin with, the products retired in each phase had to 
consist of goods from all four key textile and clothing segments: Yarn, Fabrics, Made-Up textile products, and 
Clothing. Moreover, the selected products had to correspond to an agreed fraction of each country’s 1990 T&C 
imports by volume. The U.S. postponed the removal of quotas on sensitive products until Phase III. Of the 
4,839  ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) product codes that the U.S. retired over the four phases, 62 percent 
were retired in 2005. HS codes are the group of T&C products governed by the ATC and imported by the U.S. 
2The spinning sector was the most privileged by investment. It received 47 percent of the $4 billion 
investment in the T&C industry between 1999 and 2003. After China and India, Pakistan has the third-largest 
capacity of short-staple spindles for spun yarn in the world (“Textiles and Apparel: Assessment of the 
Competitiveness of Certain Foreign Suppliers to the U.S. Market.” Investigation No. 332-448, U.S. 
International Trade Commission, 2004). 
3[International Comparison of the Hourly Labour Cost in the Primary Textile Industry (2012)].  
4The private and public sectors together formed the National Textile Institute (Faisalabad) in 1959. The 
government proposed Textile Vision 2005, which involves giving loans to upgrade equipment, interest rate and 
tax policy reforms, and promotion of product and market diversification. 
















1993-94 1259.3 820.6 29.1 17.3 129.2 285.6 
1994-95 1528.1 1081.4 38.2 19.1 144.8 340.2 
1995-96 1540.3 1275.9 39.5 24.6 174.1 422.2 
1996-97 1411.5 1262.4 36.2 27.6 194.1 456.3 
1997-98 1159.5 1250.3 58.1 23.1 200.1 508.8 
1998-99 945.2 1115.2 40.8 20.8 177.7 611.0 
1999-00 1071.6 1096.2 52.9 19.2 195.6 709.9 
2000-01 1076.6 1035.0 50.0 19.0 243.0 734.9 
2001-02 942.3 1132.7 47.4 18.2 269.8 918.5 
2002-03 928.3 1345.6 73.2 18.2 374.8 1329.0 
2003-04 1127.0 1711.7 75 18.0 404 1383 
2004-05 1057.0 1863 67 0 520 1450 
2005-06 1383.0 2108.0 39.0 13.7 588.0 2038.0 
2006-07 1428.0 2027.0 69.0 11.4 611.0 1996.0 
2007-08 1,301.0 2,011 71.0 10.4 613.0 1904.0 
2008-09 1114.8 1955.3 56.2 8.4 642.9 1735.0 
2009-10 1,433.1 1,800.1 61.5 5.3 668.2 1,744.3 
2010-11 2,201.4 2,623.2 47.0 10.3 762.3 2,088.9 




Exports of Cotton and Cotton Manufactures in Millions of US Dollars 
Period 
Other 





1993-94 129.4 612.2 509.1 4.0 3795.8 6802.5 
1994-95 163.5 641.7 688.5 1.9 4647.5 8137.2 
1995-96 179.1 648.5 703.4 1.5 5009.1 8707.1 
1996-97 208.7 736.4 688.9 1.7 5023.8 8320.3 
1997-98 245.8 746.5 696.7 1.8 4890.7 8627.7 
1998-99 255.3 651.2 742.1 1.5 4560.8 7779.3 
1999-00 307.6 771.7 886.7 1.3 5112.7 8568.6 
2000-01 328.2 827.5 910.3 1.0 5225.5 9224.7 
2001-02 351.3 882 841.5 – 5404 9123.6 
2002-03 359.7 1092.6 1146.6 – 6668.0 11160.2 
2003-04 417.0 993 1459 – 7587.7 1231.3. 
2004-05 466 1088 1635 0 8146 14391.0 
2005-06 418.0 1310 1751 0.3 9649 16451.0 
2006-07 514.0 1547.0 1798.0 0.2 10001.6 16976.0 
2007-08 537.0 1452.0 1732.3 0.2 9631.9 19052.0 
2008-09 480.1 1230.0 1740.8 – 8963.5 17688.0 
2009-10 537.2 1,269.3 1,744.3 – 9,263.3 19,290.0 
2010-11 625.0 1,773.7 2,305.6 – 12,437.2 24,810.4 
Source: All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA). 
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Table 3 
Production and Export of Yarn in Thousands of Kilograms (1971–1991) 




Quantity % of Production Quantity % of Production 
1971-72 335,702 130,158 38.77 1991-92 1,188,270 505,863 42.57 
1972-73 376,122 184,404 49.03 1992-93 1,234,539 555,294 44.98 
1973-74 379,460 100,564 26.50 1993-94 1,498,948 578,648 38.60 
1974-75 351,200 78,365 22.31 1994-95 1,413,648 522,091 36.93 
1975-76 349,653 112,182 32.08 1995-96 1,505,244 535,889 35.60 
1976-77 282,640 64,294 22.75 1996-97 1,530,855 508,188 33.20 
1977-78 297,895 59,955 20.13 1997-98 1,540,720 461,919 29.98 
1978-79 327,796 97,929 29.87 1998-99 1,547,632 421,481 27.23 
1979-80 362,862 99,834 27.51 1999-00 1,678,536 512,971 30.56 
1980-81 374,947 95,232 25.40 2000-01 1,729,129 545,134 31.59 
1981-82 430,154 95,621 22.23 2001-02 1,818,345 539,500 29.67 
1982-83 448,430 134,100 29.90 2002-03 1,924,936 525,130 27.28 
1983-84 431,580 101,805 23.59 2003-04 1,938,908 514,279 26.52 
1984-85 431,731 125,855 29.15 2004-05 2,290,340 520,782 22.74 
1985-86 482,186 157,895 32.75 2005-06 2,216,605 691,492 31.20 
1986-87 586,371 259,668 44.28 2006-07 2,727,566 699,259 25.64 
1987-88 685,031 210,950 30.79 2007-08 2,809,383 594,936 21.18 
1988-89 767,434 291,953 38.04 2008-09 2,862,411 526,246 18.38 
1989-90 925,382 374,976 40.52 2009-10 2,880,970 612,413 21.26 
1990-91 1,055,228 501,072 47.48 2010-11 3,016,972 549,947 18.23 
Source: All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA). 
 
Table 4 
Production and Export of Cloth in Million Square Meters (1971–1991) 




Quantity % of Production Quantity % of Production 
1971-72 1350.67 409.81 30.34 1991-92 3238.99 1196.12 36.93 
1972-73 1238.11 517.98 41.84 1992-93 3360.00 1127.58 33.56 
1973-74 1828.72 353.02 19.30 1993-94 3378.00 1046.79 30.99 
1974-75 1827.08 440.81 24.13 1994-95 3100.75 1160.66 37.43 
1975-76 1503.36 463.84 30.85 1995-96 3706.00 1323.09 35.70 
1976-77 1445.30 416.84 28.84 1996-97 3781.20 1257.43 33.25 
1977-78 1573.07 453.47 28.83 1997-98 3913.70 1271.27 32.48 
1978-79 1487.10 531.53 35.74 1998-99 4386.79 1355.17 30.89 
1979-80 1720.02 545.77 31.73 1999-00 4987.16 1574.88 31.58 
1980-81 1834.00 500.90 27.31 2000-01 5591.40 1736.00 31.05 
1981-82 2200.44 584.35 26.56 2001-02 5653.09 1957.35 34.62 
1982-83 2048.77 605.33 29.55 2002-03 5650.52 2005.38 35.49 
1983-84 2165.98 664.38 30.67 2003-04 6833.12 2412.87 35.31 
1984-85 2000.00 687.62 34.38 2004-05 6480.67 2751.56 42.46 
1985-86 1985.40 727.35 36.63 2005-06 8524.26 2633.98 30.90 
1986-87 2009.85 693.42 34.50 2006-07 8694.92 2211.84 25.44 
1987-88 2230.82 848.61 38.04 2007-08 9005.44 2035.14 22.60 
1988-89 2250.00 845.33 37.57 2008-09 9015.26 1898.54 21.06 
1989-90 2734.77 1017.87 37.22 2009-10 8949.77 1753.12 19.59 
1990-91 2854.00 1056.53 37.02 2010-11 9018.32 2297.49 25.48 
Source: All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA). 
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Fig. 1.  Mean Productivity of Textile and Clothing Firms—Levinsohn and 
Petrin Productivity Measure 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of mean productivity of the sample of T&C firms 
used in the paper. It is computed using Levinsohn and Petrin productivity measure (which 
we explain later in the paper). For the time period under consideration, textile firms have 
a much higher mean productivity than clothing firms. Furthermore, we notice an upward 
trend in the mean productivity of both types of firms. The focus of this paper is on the 
exports of T&C products by Pakistan to the U.S. only. The reason why this is an 
interesting case to consider is because the United States is the most important trading 
partner of Pakistan for a sizeable majority of T&C products. In fact, for most of the 
clothing products exported, the U.S. captures more than 90 percent of total market share.
5
 
Moreover, the fill rates for nearly all T&C products are very close to one hundred, 




Fig. 2.  Level of Imports and Adjusted Quota Base (Examples) 
 
 
5This was verified using the statistical database of the All Pakistan Textile Mills Association 
(APTMA). 
6Fill rate is defined in the literature as total imports as a percentage of adjusted base quota. Even though 
the adjusted base quotas can exceed base quotas, fill rates cannot exceed 100 since they are defined as imports 
































































































102 Zara Liaqat 
 
 
Source: US MFA/ATC Database [Brambilla, et al. (2007)]. 
 
Let us look at two examples.
7
 Figure 2 exhibits total imports into the U.S. from 
Pakistan and adjusted quota base from 1984 up to 2004 for two T&C products, one from 
the textile and clothing industries each. For Textile and Fabric Finishing as well as Men’s 
and Boys’ Cut and Sew Suit, Coat, and Overcoat, the actual number of imports closely 
followed the adjusted quota base. In the light of the phasing out of MFA, this evidence 
makes the case of Pakistan-U.S. trade in T&C industry all the more interesting for closer 
study. 
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we present a brief literature 
review of the topic. In Section 3, we describe a methodology that can be used to measure 
the effect of liberalisation on firm efficiency, and the data used in our analysis. Empirical 
results are presented and discussed in Section 4. The main conclusions and policy 
implications are summarised in Section 5. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A variety of studies look into the efficiency of manufacturing industries as a result 
of trade liberalisation [Pavcnik (2002); Krueger and Baran (1982); Bernard, et al. (2006); 
Sasidaran and Shanmugam (2008)]. Many developing countries have embarked on 
programmes of trade and financial liberalisation. In the old trade theory, welfare gains 
from trade are because of specialisation in line with the comparative advantage. On the 
other hand, in the new trade theory, these welfare gains accrue from economies of scale 
and expansion of product varieties [Bernard, et al. (2007)]. Empirical analyses at the firm 
level offer evidence for aggregate productivity growth driven by the contraction and exit 
of low-productivity firms and expansion and entry of high productivity firms. Pavcnik 
(2002) finds that approximately two-thirds of the 19 percent increase in aggregate 
productivity following Chile’s trade liberalisation in the late 1970s is because of the 
relatively longer survival and growth of high-productivity plants. Another study by 
Krueger and Baran (1982) estimates the rates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
for two-digit manufacturing industries in Turkey during 1963–1976. The paper shows 
that periods of slower productivity growth coincided with periods of stringent trade 
 
7Table A.1 in Appendix A displays the adjusted quota base, level of imports and fill rates for a sample 
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regimes. These findings are not confined to developing countries. The effects of a 
reduction in U.S. trade costs are examined by Bernard, et al. (2006).  
These studies focus on liberalisation that primarily comprised reduction in tariff 
rates or a fall in trade costs. There is limited evidence, for example, on the effect of a 
liberalisation regime mainly featuring an increase in the amount of quota, as in the case 
of  MFA expiration that a sizeable number of studies examine on the reallocation of 
production and exports across countries. Using a time series of product-level data from 
the U.S. on quotas and tariffs that comprise the MFA, Evans and Harrigan (2005) analyse 
how MFA affected sources and prices of U.S. apparel imports, with a particular focus on 
East Asian exporters during the 1990s. Brambilla, et al. (2007) examine China’s 
experience under the U.S. apparel and textile quotas. These studies pertain to the 
macroeconomic outcomes of the end of MFA, and do not consider the impact on textile 
producing firms. Using Bangladeshi garment exporters’ data, Demidova, et al. (2006) 
model and present evidence for the pattern of exports and performance of heterogeneous 
firms in response to variations in trade policy in diverse product and export destinations. 
A study by Sasidaran and Shanmugam (2008) attempts to empirically investigate the 
implications of the end of MFA on firm efficiency in Indian textile industry. By 
employing stochastic frontier analysis, they estimate the overall and input specific 
efficiency values for 215 sample firms during 1993 and 2006. The results of the analysis 
illustrate that average efficiency dropped over the years. However, their empirical 
methodology does not utilise the actual number of quotas imposed by the developed 
countries on the import of T&C products from India, and instead models the end of MFA 
by introducing a dummy variable for each of the four phases. Our paper, on the other 
hand, uses an exceptional database initially used by Brambilla, et al. (2007), which traces 
U.S. trading partners’ exports to the U.S. in addition to the actual amount of quota under 
the regimes determined by MFA (1974–1995) and the succeeding ATC (1995–2005). 
This source of data is combined with a unique company-level data set which is a 
compilation of annual reports of a representative sample of T&C companies in Pakistan. 
Hence, the paper merges micro-level data of firms with the data on quotas at the industry 
level in order to answer an essential question which has been the centre of debate in the 
new trade theory. 
A large number of papers that analyse the impact of trade liberalisation on firm 
performance are repeatedly criticised for endogeneity inherent in either the estimation of 
productivity or in the principal regression model used to regress the performance variable 
on a proxy for trade liberalisation, such as the tariff rate [Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005); 
Grossman and Helpman (1994); Mobarak and Purbasari (2006)]. Hence, the relationship 
between openness and performance cannot be taken to imply causality. This is usually the 
case because liberalisation is more often a part of a broader package of reforms; and 
improvement in firm efficiency cannot be traced to trade reforms specifically. Moreover, 
even if trade reforms do not come as a part of a package of reforms, there is always a 
possibility of lobbying by firms in order to circumvent these reforms whenever these are 
feared to harm them. This is widespread in the case of developing countries. There is  
literature that argues that a selection of industries have political power to lobby 
governments for protection [Grossman and Helpman (1994)]. Mobarak and Purbasari 
(2006) find that political connections do not affect tariff rates in Indonesia: it is hard for 
governments in developing countries to offer favours since they are under the close 
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scrutiny of international organisations.
8
 The potential bias is also diminished as the 
estimates include fixed effects. If time-varying industry characteristics could, at the same 
time, affect both productivity and tariffs, the bias may persist. Just like Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2005), they use the 1991 levels of tariffs as instruments for changes in tariffs.
9
 
Because of the regression specification used in the paper, whereby we regress the change 
in firm productivity on the adjusted level of quotas at the six-digit NAICS industry level, 
we can rule out the possibility of lobbying by firms. This is because it is not viable for an 
individual firm to influence the amount of textile quota at the industry level. 
Consequently, the MFA expiration can be thought of as a ‘natural experiment.’ This 
methodology has been used in order to avoid the potential problem of endogeneity of the 
trade proxy that is used in the empirical estimation of the effect of elimination of import 
quotas. Even if the actual amount of quota, that is obtained by each individual firm, were 
available, including that in the basic regression as a control variable, it would have been 
problematic due to the endogeneity of the firm’s ability to obtain the quota license in a 
regression where the firm’s efficiency is the dependent variable. Due to the availability of 
a considerable amount of highly disaggregated NAICS industry level quota data, the 
employment of this methodology allows us not only to overcome the potential 
endogeneity,  but also to introduce sufficient amount of variation in the control variable 
used.  
Last but not least, we use the structural techniques proposed by Olley and 
Pakes, and Levinsohn and Petrin in order to take care of endogeneity in the 
estimation of production functions. We notice that the results vary across textile and 
clothing industries; MFA expiration lead to an increase in the average productivity of 
textile producing firms but a significant reduction in the mean productivity of 
clothing and garment producers. Finally, in order to measure the effect of quotas 
directly on firm’s output, we regress output on the adjusted level of quotas and trade 
costs. In the textile sector, an increase in the adjusted level of quotas leads to a 
significant rise in the firm’s output. Nevertheless, this result is not statistically 
significant for the clothing sector. 
In short, the most important contribution of this paper is that it is one of the very 
few studies that investigate the effect of liberalisation in the form of phasing out of 
quotas on firm-level productivity in the textile and clothing industry. Unlike most other 
studies in the literature which mainly analyse the impact of trade liberalisation in a 
developing country, for example, in the form of a reduction in average tariff rates, this 
paper investigates the liberalisation episode initiated by the U.S. by means of eliminating 
import quotas on textile and clothing products exported by developing countries to the 
U.S.  It underlines cross-sector disparity in the effect of MFA expiration in the 
developing country and that trade reforms may influence different sectors 
heterogeneously even within the manufacturing industry of Pakistan.  
 
8Mobarak, A. M. and D. Purbasari (2006). Corrupt Protection for Sale to Firms: Evidence from 
Indonesia. (Unpublished). 
9The instruments that they use are: 1991 levels of output tariffs, 1991 levels of input tariffs, an 
interaction between the 1991 input tariffs and a firm-level indicator equal to one if the firm was an importer in 
all years, a dummy indicator for product codes that consisted of at least one nine-digit HS code that was barred 
from the commitment to cut bound tariffs to 40 percent, and the share of skilled workers at the five-digit 
industry level. 
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3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we discuss the empirical methodology used to measure the impact 
of the end of MFA on firm performance in the textile and apparel industries of Pakistan 
from 1992 to 2010. We will then describe the data set used in the paper. To determine the 
effect of trade liberalisation on firm performance, we first need to find a measure of 
productivity for the firms in our sample. This measure is then related to an index of 
openness using a simple regression equation.  
There are quite a few ways of measuring the productivity change in response 
to a change in policy. An econometric issue facing the estimation of production 
functions is the likelihood that some of these inputs are unobserved. If the observed 
inputs are chosen as a function of these unobserved inputs, then there is an 
endogeneity problem [Ackerberg, et al. (2005)]. A second endogeneity problem 
appears because of sample selection.  There is a group of contemporary techniques 
alongside the dynamic panel data literature and the methods introduced by Olley and 
Pakes (1996), and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The Olley and Pakes methodology 
(OP) is derived from dynamic optimisation of firms, whereby it is assumed that 
unobserved productivity follows a first order Markov process and capital is 
accumulated by means of a deterministic dynamic investment process.
10
  Levinsohn 
and Petrin (LP) adopt a similar approach to solving the endogeneity problem. Instead 
of using an investment demand equation, they use an intermediate input demand 




Consider a firm with a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
                 
      
      
     … … … … … (1) 
where output of firm i in six-digit industry j at time t,     , is a function of labour, 
    , capital,     , and materials,     . We want to test if productivity of firm i is a 
function of trade policy, denoted by  . Taking natural logs, denoted by small letters, 
we get: 
                                   … … … … (2) 
The output of firm i is computed using the firm’s total revenue which is the only 
proxy for total production that is available in our data. Therefore, the total revenue of the 
firm is deflated by two-digit industry-level producer price indices to obtain     . The real 
labour,     , is taken to be the total number of employees, and the amount of material 
inputs,     , is retrieved using total material expenditure.
12
 Although domestic and 
 
10Profit maximisation generates an investment demand function that is determined by two state 
variables, capital and productivity. If the investment demand function is monotonically increasing in 
productivity, it is feasible to invert the investment function and get an expression for productivity as a function 
of capital and investment. 
11See Olley and Pakes (1996), and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for a complete explanation of the 
method. A brief review is also given in Appendix B. 
12Additional units of both labour and material inputs are assumed to be equally productive, and hence, 
deemed to be of equal marginal productivity. 
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imported inputs should be adjusted by separate deflators, the balance sheet data does not 
provide information on the share of imported inputs. Hence, all material inputs are 
deflated with a two-digit producer price deflator.
13
 Productivity is then computed using 
LP, and the change in firm productivity is regressed on the change in the adjusted level of 
quotas and trade costs: 
                                                                     (3) 
where                 is the logarithm of adjusted level of quotas, and 
              is the logarithm of industry trade costs at date t-1.    and    are time 
and industry fixed effects, respectively, and     is the error term. Following Bernard, 
et al. (2006), we define industry variable trade costs as the sum of ad valorem duty 
and ad valorem freight and insurance rates.
14
 The inclusion of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) such as quotas in the regression equation, unlike Bernard, et al. (2006), is an 
added advantage of this empirical methodology since NTBs are a vital source of 
trade distortions.      includes other control variables: a dummy variable for the city 
in which the firm is located, size, age and capital intensity of the firm, whether or not 
the firm is ISO certified, whether or not the firm is multinational and, lastly, the 
Herfindahl index of the industry at the six-digit level. Size is measured by the 
number of workers; capital intensity is the ratio of capital to number of employees; 
firm age is the number of years since establishment; the Herfindahl index is an 
indicator of the amount of competition. 
In order to quantify the impact of quotas directly on the firm’s output, we regress 
output on the level of quotas: 
                                                
                                             … … … (7) 
 
13Amiti and Konings (2007) show that domestic and imported input prices normally move together, 
provided they are substitutes. Their results are robust to deflating both domestic and imported material inputs by 
the same five-digit domestic materials deflators. 
14Bernard, et al. (2006) define variable trade costs (      ) for industry j in year t as the sum of ad 
valorem duty (   ) and ad valorem freight and insurance (   ) rates: 
                   … … … … … … … (4) 
The ad valorem duty rate is duties collected (        ) corresponding to free-on-board customs value of 
imports (     ): 
      
        
     
 … … … … … … … (5) 
Likewise, the ad valorem freight rate is the markup of the cost-insurance-freight value (     ) over 
      relative to      : 
      
     
     
    … … … … … … … (6) 
The rate for industry j is the weighted average rate across products in j, using the import values from 
the source countries as weights. This measure of trade costs has several advantages. It includes information 
concerning both trade policy and transportation costs, and it varies across industries and time. For a complete 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this measure, see Bernard, et al. (2006). 
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This paper uses Balance Sheet Data of Pakistani Listed and Non-Listed 
Companies (BSDPC) which is a survey of a representative sample of 321 T&C 
companies in Pakistan for the years 1992 to 2003. The surveys encompass a wide range 
of topics.
15
 The data set is an unbalanced panel data and it covers almost all large and 
medium-sized formal manufacturing enterprises. However, the coverage of the industrial 
sector is not complete since informal enterprises are excluded, and small formal firms are 
under-represented. The core survey is organised into four parts: Balance Sheet, Profit & 
Loss Account, Cash Flow Statement, and Accounts Section. For each company and year, 
we observe the sales revenue, input use, investment, wage bill, and all other costs, as well 
as industry codes and firm identity codes that allow us to track establishments over time. 
However, several observations are either not available or are reported as missing for 
different variables, such as, wages and sales. We test whether these values are 
systematically missing for particular types of firms, industries, or years but find that this 
was not the case. 
The literature talks about a sample selection problem stemming from the possible 
association between TFP and plant exit; the unbalanced nature of our panel deals with 
this potential challenge to some extent. Entering and exiting firms are detected in the data 
by comparing firm identity codes overtime. Whenever there were gaps in the time-series 
data for a firm, we interpolated one- and two-year gaps in employment and sales 
variables and excluded the firm altogether if there was a larger gap in the data. To 
estimate Equations (3) and (7) using a panel of firms, we needed data on real output, 
capital stock, labour, raw materials, and their respective shares in real output. Nominal 
output deflated by sectoral price deflators gave the real output.
16
 Real labour was found 
by deflating the total wage bill by industry wage rate.
17
 Materials were also deflated 
using two-digit sectoral price deflators.
18
 The real capital stock was calculated by 
deflating net fixed assets by sectoral investment deflators. Table 5 provides summary 
statistics for the balance sheet data used. 
 
 
15They are carried out in cooperation with the Lahore University of Management Sciences 
(LUMS), Pakistan. The survey is completed by managing directors and accountants of  the company. The 
data compiled by LUMS only covers the period 1992 to 2003. We updated the dataset to add seven more 
years of data on sales revenue, input use, investment, and so forth. The paper, therefore, uses data from 
1992 to 2010. This was done in order to compute firms’ productivity during the final phase of MFA 
expiration as well, since we know that the initial phases of ATC were not very severe for producers in 
developed countries. 
16The Economic Survey of Pakistan, which is published annually by the Ministry of Finance, 
Government of Pakistan, provides price indices at the two-digit industry level for output and intermediate inputs 
which are used as deflators. 
17Real labour is taken to be the total number of employees, and not the number of hours worked, since 
the hourly wage rate is not known. Many firms list the number of employees directly so there is no need to 
deflate the wage bill by the industry wage rate. 
18Ideally, material inputs should be deflated by separate price indices for each different type of material 
used in the production of the final good. However, the balance sheet data only lists the total material 
expenditure. Harrison (1994) shows that the estimates based on deflating the material inputs using the Input-
Output table for each sector are not very different from those computed using the two-digit sectoral price 
deflators. 




Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Ln(Sales) 4717 19.24889 3.725365 
Ln(Fixed Assets) 4718 11.5004    9.505546 
Ln(Labour) 4718 16.36191      1.92692 
Ln(Raw Materials) 4718 18.70915     3.581584 
Ln(Net Profit) 4718 12.99495     10.32405 
Ln(Investment) 4813 4.016176     7.223366 
Productivity (Levinsohn and Petrin) 4717 10.55175     5.720158 
Productivity (Olley and Pakes) 4717 1.870537     3.044538 
Age 2895 23.78066     16.09899 
Ln(Age) 2846 2.9679     .8172853 
Ln
2
(Age) 2846 9.476151     4.306341 
Ln(Capital to Labour Ratio) 4407 .733027     .5847288 
Herfindahl Index 4813 .8199503     .6192361 
ISO Certified 4606 .6743378     .4686726 
Multinational 4606 .09835     .2978196 
Share of Foreign Ownership  4436 .2193417     .4138473 
Exporting Firm 4606 .8790708     .3260804 
Importing Firm 4606 .4240122    .4942458 
Ln(Cost of Imports) 2385 .1535817 .108629 
Ln(Adjusted Base New) 3980 29.10755 16.11072 
Ln(Adjusted Base) 2499 16.72591 1.134198 
Ln(Imports) 1544 16.43371 2.013854 
Average Fill Rate 2143 .806451 .1900999 
 
This paper is based on a panel of firms instead of industry data. Accordingly, we 
can be fairly specific about the sources of productivity change. It tracks a single firm 
through time, eliminating the obscuring firm-specific effects. The paper utilises the data 
initially used by Brambilla, et al. (2007) that traces U.S. trading partners’ performance 
under the quota regimes determined by MFA and ATC. The database is assembled from 
U.S. trading partners’ Expired Performance Reports, which were used by the U.S. Office 
of Textile and Apparel (OTEXA) to supervise trading partners’ fulfilment with the 
MFA/ATC quotas. Provided by Ron Foote of the U.S. Census Bureau, they record 
imports, base quotas and quota adjustments by OTEXA category and the year for all 
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countries with which the U.S. negotiated a bilateral quota arrangement.
19
 The negotiated 
quota for any given category is stated in terms of square meter equivalents (SME) of 
fabric.
20
 The data on trade costs is taken from Bernard, et al. (2006) which provides data 
on free-on-board customs value of imports, ad valorem duty and ad valorem freight and 
insurance rates for the underlying four-digit product-level U.S. import data.
21
 The next 
section discusses the estimation results. 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
To determine the effect of trade liberalisation on firm efficiency, we first need to 
find a measure of productivity for the firms in our sample. We estimate the production 
function coefficients for firms in each sector separately using a Cobb-Douglas production 
function and the structural techniques proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin. These estimates 
are used to work out the log of measured TFP of firm i at time t for each six-digit 
industry j. The change in firm productivity is then regressed on the change in adjusted 
level of quotas, allowing for time and industry fixed effects. Table 6 reports the 
production function estimates for T&C firms using LP. Robust standard errors corrected 
for clustering at the firm level are stated in parentheses. The regression results are 
illustrated in Tables 7 to 8. 
 
Table 6 
Production Function Estimates for Textile and Clothing Firms—Levinsohn and Petrin 
 Textile Clothing 
 (1) (2) 
Employment 0.246*** 0.285*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0327) 
Fixed Assets 0.0312*** 0.0340** 
 (0.00805) (0.0152) 
Raw Materials 0.125 0.171 
 (0.116) (0.160) 
No. of Observations 3274 1443 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. *** Significant at, or 
below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 percent.  
 
 
19The base quota is the initially negotiated quota level decided at the beginning of an agreement term. 
Adjusted base quotas indicate the use of ‘flexibilities’, which allowed countries to go over their base quota in a 
particular period by borrowing unexploited base quota, across categories within a year and across years within a 
category, up to a specified percentage of the receiving category. 
20In addition, when the quotas are completely removed in Phase IV, the adjusted quota base is 
essentially equal to infinity. There are a number of possible ways of handling it. For example, we could assume 
a ‘very large’ value of the adjusted level of quotas, and vary that value to test if our results are sensitive to this 
hypothetical value of the adjusted level of quotas. Another possible way is to predict the adjusted quota level 
using the past values of the fill rates. A number of these methods were used in order to prove that the results are 
robust to functional form differences. 
21The data on trade costs is available only for the years 1992-2004. 
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Table 7 
Effect of Elimination of Quota-Restrictions on Textile Firm Productivity— 
Levinsohn and Petrin 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Adjusted Quota 0.0238*** 1.277** 1.266** 1.250** 1.192** 1.567* 1.692** 
 (0.00520) (0.534) (0.530) (0.557) (0.535) (0.875) (0.850) 
Cost of Imports  –0.126 –0.124 –0.120 –0.122 0.0965 0.0971 
  (0.225) (0.225) (0.223) (0.237) (0.175) (0.173) 
Herfindahl Index  0.0619 0.0602 0.0596 0.0673 0.0924* 0.0971* 
  (0.0509) (0.0507) (0.0509) (0.0501) (0.0547) (0.0566) 
Multinational   0.410* 0.215 0.149 0.0126 0.162 
   (0.234) (0.206) (0.200) (0.192) (0.261) 
ISO Certified    0.830*** 0.827*** 1.020* 0.839 
    (0.176) (0.169) (0.578) (0.574) 
K/L (–1)     –0.0333 –0.0709 –0.0696 
     (0.158) (0.0823) (0.0883) 
Size (–1)     0.0474* –0.0246 –0.0273 
     (0.0282) (0.0203) (0.0198) 
Age      0.118 0.117 
      (0.206) (0.222) 
Age
2
      0.0262 0.0346 
      (0.0430) (0.0510) 
Constant 11.47*** –12.03 –11.80 –12.47 –11.96 0 0 
 (0.305) (10.03) (9.973) (10.50) (10.20) (0) (0) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
No. of Observations 2767 1570 1570 1570 1567 996 996 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. (–1) denotes lagged variables.               
*** Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 percent.  
 
Table 8 
Effect of Elimination of Quota-Restrictions on Clothing Firm Productivity— 
Levinsohn and Petrin 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Adjusted Quota –0.972*** –1.003*** –0.998*** –1.069*** –1.692*** –0.753*** 
 (0.246) (0.248) (0.248) (0.255) (0.327) (0.195) 
Cost of Imports (–1) –8.697 –8.787 –8.793 –9.737* –11.70 –11.22 
 (6.040) (6.041) (6.051) (5.796) (7.886) (8.823) 
Herfindahl Index (–1)  –0.155** –0.155** –0.192** –0.241*** –0.182** 
  (0.0719) (0.0720) (0.0765) (0.0879) (0.0782) 
Multinational   –0.773 –0.749 –4.371*** –2.368 
   (1.546) (1.572) (1.538) (1.981) 
ISO Certified    0.403 1.097 1.719 
    (1.148) (1.943) (2.174) 
K/L (–1)    0.946* 0.969 0.807 
    (0.563) (0.659) (0.700) 
Size (–1)    0.0885* 0.117** 0.0716 
    (0.0458) (0.0536) (0.0572) 
Age     0.669 0.104 
     (0.490) (0.513) 
Age
2
     –0.0968 0.277 
     (0.196) (0.248) 
Constant 0 0 14.13*** 16.59*** 26.45*** 0 
 (0) (0) (4.739) (4.371) (6.223) (0) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
No. of Observations 503 503 503 502 315 315 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. (–1) denotes lagged variables.              
*** Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 percent.  
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4.1.  Effect on Productivity 
Tables 7 and 8 report the estimation results for the effect of elimination of quota 
restrictions on textile and clothing firm productivity, respectively. The results vary across 
the two types of industries: an increase in adjusted level of quotas, on average, brings 
about a significant increase in the productivity of firms in the textile industry (see Table 
7) and a reduction in mean productivity in the clothing industry (refer to Table 8). These 
estimation results are derived after controlling for the firm’s size, capital intensity, age, 
whether or not the firm is ISO certified, whether or not the firm is a multinational, 
Herfindahl index of the industry at the six-digit level, and lastly, the city in which the 
firm is located. Although trade costs do not seem to have a significant impact on textile 
firms, there is clearly a negative relationship between trade costs and the productivity of 
garment producers; the productivity of clothing firms goes up, on average, if trade costs 
go down, and the estimates are significantly different from zero in a number of cases as 
can be seen in Table 8. As far as trade costs coefficient for textile firms is concerned, the 
estimates take both positive and negative values, and none of the values are statistically 
significant. The positive coefficient of trade cost for textile producers might be indicative 
of a selection effect for these types of firms, as is highlighted in the literature on the new 
trade theory [Pavcnik (2002)]. This suggests that as a consequence of a rise in variable 
trade cost, coupled with exposure to international competition, only the most productive 
firms are able to survive. As a result, an upsurge in trade cost will cause the mean 
productivity of textile producers to go up. 
Let us look at other control variables in Tables 7 and 8. Again, as far as capital 
intensity of the firm is concerned, the two types of firms display disparate results. Higher 
capital intensity has a significantly positive impact on productivity of clothing firms but 
not on the productivity of textile producers. For most of the different specifications 
shown in Table 7, the coefficient for size is negative for textile firms. However, the only 
case where it is significant is when it takes a positive value. On the other hand, it is 
always positive and significant for clothing firms (see Table 8).  
Another intriguing point to be noted is that the sign of Herfindahl index coefficient 
is positive and significant for only textile firms; on the other hand, it is negative and 
highly significant for clothing firms, as can be seen in Tables 7 and 8. This indicates that 
higher concentration in the industry results in lower productivity for clothing firms but 
not for textile firms. One would generally expect that greater degree of concentration in 
an industry leads to greater market power for firms in that industry and, hence, lowers 
their productivity growth. This is not the case for textile producers. One possible 
explanation for this result is that, although there might be a small number of firms with a 
lot of market power, there is an intense competition amongst them which forces them to 
become more productive in order to capture an even bigger market share. That is why 
higher concentration in the textile industry would imply that textile producers are, on 
average, more productive than if there were a large number of firms capturing an almost 
similar market share. While this explanation is plausible, another explanation could be 
related to returns to scale.  The textile industry is dominated by a few capital intensive 
firms with higher returns to scale.  With the expansion of quotas, these firms might be 
capable of ramping up their output, and productivity, rapidly because of their already 
large capital investment.  Within the textile industry, sub-industries with more of these 
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large firms (concentrated sub-industries) will be better able to ramp up output and 
productivity.  On the contrary, the lower returns to scale and lower capital intensity of the 
clothing industry may restrict the output and productivity expansion.  
Textile multinational firms, on average, tend to have higher productivity compared 
to non-multinational textile firms (see Table 7). This is not the case for clothing 
producers: the multinational clothing firms have a significantly lower mean productivity 
compared to non-multinational clothing firms (see Table 8). Older textile firms, which 
are also likely to be bigger in size, appear to be much more productive than their younger 
counterparts.  
For most of the above-mentioned control variables, we have seen that the results 
are different across two types of firms. The only case where it is indistinguishable is in 
the case of ISO certified T&C firms. ISO certification affects firm efficiency positively: a 
firm certified for its quality management system has a higher productivity, on average, 
than a firm that is not certified (see Tables 7 and 8). These estimation results are arrived 
at after controlling for industry, time and city fixed effects. The city fixed effects take 
into account the fact that some firms are located in more developed areas compared to 
others. There may be differences in infrastructural facilities in different parts of the 
country which are taken care of by regional fixed effects. 
Furthermore, we run this regression separately for the MFA period (1992-1994) 
and post-MFA period (1995-2010), along with each of the four phases individually.
22
 
Table 9 demonstrates the estimation results for the four phases. In all the phases, an 
increase in the adjusted level of quotas brings about a significant reduction in the clothing 
firm’s productivity and an increase in the productivity of firms in textile industry. This is 
also true for post-MFA period as a whole. Only in Phase IV do we observe that the 
productivity of clothing firms is positively related to the level of the quotas. Nevertheless, 
the positive coefficient is not statistically significant. For a majority of control variables 
described above, we do not observe a noticeable change in either the sign or the 
magnitude of coefficients (see Table 9). 
 
4.2.  Effect on Output 
In order to measure the effect of quotas directly on the firm’s output, we regress 
output on the adjusted level of quotas and trade costs. The results are shown in Table 10. 
There are a number of interesting points to be examined here. First of all, the results vary 
for both types of industries. In the textile sector, an increase in the adjusted level of 
quotas leads to significant rise in the firm’s output. For the clothing sector, however, this 
result is not statistically significant. Since quotas are measured by quantity and not value, 
under a given quota, producers try to manufacture high value products. Consequently, 
MFA expiration is expected to bring about a shift in the production of lower-value 
products. There is a significant reduction in output if trade costs go up in the textile 
sector. This, in contrast, is not true for clothing firms: an increase in trade costs, on 
average, results in an increase in output in clothing industry and the estimates are 
significantly different from zero in nearly all the cases (see Table 10).  
 
 
22The estimation results for the MFA and post-MFA periods alone are not shown here but can be made 
available upon request. 




Effect of Elimination of Quota-Restrictions on Firm Productivity— 
Levinsohn and Petrin 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Variable Textile Clothing Textile Clothing Textile Clothing Textile Clothing 
Adjusted Quota 0.862 –0.466 0.845 –1.424** 6.039*** –2.291* 0.0546 0.0200 
 (0.539) (0.362) (0.673) (0.682) (0.890) (1.230) (0.108) (0.155) 
Cost of Imports 0.00578 4.801 –6.675 5.707 2.009 –1.788 – – 
 (0.289) (3.895) (4.732) (5.436) (6.765) (8.671) – – 
Age 0.364 1.524* –0.193 0.00114 2.098 0.0364 4.530 –4.135 
 (0.449) (0.840) (1.007) (0.283) (2.655) (0.867) (3.088) (3.293) 
Age2 –0.00151 –0.171 0.0873 0.0409 –0.319 0.0312 –0.629 1.279 
 (0.0870) (0.380) (0.188) (0.240) (0.411) (0.433) (0.457) (0.859) 
Size (–1) 0.0271 0.106* 0.0196 0.119 0.0985 0.122*** 0.0348* 0.0370 
 (0.0328) (0.0642) (0.0284) (0.0737) (0.0645) (0.0372) (0.0188) (0.0293) 
K/L (–1) –0.256** 0.618 0.0456 0.163 0.0513 2.254*** –0.252** 0.0254 
 (0.116) (0.579) (0.121) (0.205) (0.236) (0.779) (0.102) (0.0816) 
Herfindahl Index 0.0734 –0.101 0.00460 –0.162* 0.190 0.0704 –0.0418 –0.00690 
 (0.0600) (0.0741) (0.0477) (0.0857) (0.167) (0.107) (0.0504) (0.0539) 
ISO Certified 0.00166 –0.0829 1.099 0.647 0.789 –1.939 1.713 –0.972 
 (0.241) (5.173) (0.826) (2.137) (0.793) (2.815) (1.071) (8.757) 
Multinational –0.217 –0.557 0.429 –0.712 0.154 0.666 –0.528 –5.204 
 (0.309) (1.888) (0.300) (1.859) (0.256) (3.135) (0.401) (3.246) 
Constant 0 0 2.036 15.17 –106.2*** 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (14.52) (12.41) (17.02) (0) (0) (0) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 298 89 405 139 202 61 645 192 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. (–1) denotes lagged variables.              
*** Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 percent. 
 
Table 10 
Effect of Elimination of Quota-Restrictions on Output 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Textile Clothing 
Raw Materials 0.264*** 0.285*** 0.132*** 0.0816** 0.0344 0.0102 
 (0.0629) (0.0741) (0.0503) (0.0393) (0.0286) (0.0269) 
Labour 0.0907*** 0.0711*** 0.0597*** 0.114** 0.0315 0.0167 
 (0.0232) (0.0246) (0.0200) (0.0458) (0.0353) (0.0456) 
Fixed Assets 0.0550* 0.0448 0.0764* 0.0936** 0.122** 0.0712 
 (0.0329) (0.0390) (0.0453) (0.0410) (0.0533) (0.0539) 
Adjusted Quota Level 0.137 1.523** 2.409** 0.494 0.420 0.975* 
 (0.246) (0.702) (1.049) (0.334) (0.353) (0.509) 
Cost of Imports (–1)  –0.287 –0.422*  7.774* 11.71* 
  (0.210) (0.232)  (4.265) (6.185) 
Multinational  0.379* 0.386  –1.981 –3.538 
  (0.200) (0.285)  (2.074) (3.479) 
ISO Certified  0.770*** 0.979  1.709*** 2.512*** 
  (0.191) (0.676)  (0.421) (0.896) 
Age   –0.0135   2.699 
   (0.249)   (1.925) 
Age2   0.0652   –0.493 
   (0.0574)   (0.428) 
Constant 8.567* 0 –32.82 6.674 3.331 0 
 (4.752) (0) (20.00) (6.044) (6.514) (0) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 1811 1461 929 648 503 316 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. (–1) denotes lagged variables.              
*** Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 percent. 
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Another remarkable point is that a textile multinational firm has, on average, a 
significantly higher output compared to a textile firm that is not a multinational company, 
whereas, the corresponding coefficient for clothing firms is negative. On average, older 
textile firms produce lesser output, but this is not true for clothing firms. Both, the ISO 
certified textile as well as clothing firms have a higher output compared to a textile or 
clothing firm that is not ISO certified, and this finding is statistically significant. To sum 
up, MFA expiration led to an increase in output of T&C firms in Pakistan. However, for a 
majority of specifications that we consider, this result is statistically significant only for 
the textile firms (refer to Table 10). 
 
4.3.  Discussion and Limitations of Analysis 
The above analysis highlights cross-sector variation in the effect of MFA expiration. 
As is frequently emphasised in the new trade theory literature, trade reforms often influence 
different sectors heterogeneously even within the manufacturing industry. However, what 
seems intriguing is that in our case the outcome differs within what is typically lumped 
together as the textile industry. A liberalisation episode such as phasing of quotas may 
generate divergent changes in productivity levels of different categories of products even 
within an industry. MFA expiration will potentially boost competition, both between and 
within countries, weakening tendencies toward oligopolies, thereby resulting in technological 
advancement and productivity growth. We see this happening in the textile sector. Pakistan 
has had a relatively better textile sector historically. The textile industry is labour intensive and 
the primary input is cotton. The country has a high production of cotton and a sizeable labour 
force that confirms its strong revealed comparative advantage in the production of textile 
goods. On the other hand, clothing industry still faces the challenge of obsolete machinery. 
Energy outages, workforce development, product standards, fabric finishing, styles and 
patterns, customs and port procedures, and security are other factors that shape productivity 
growth. One reason why TFP may decline after the end of MFA for garment firms is 
competition from foreign sellers of garments in the Pakistani market. Since TFP confounds 
the effect of efficiency  if its market share declines, it may result in depressing its measure. 
Any form of liberalisation like this has two opposing effects: market stealing of imports 
lowers sales for domestic firms and leaves less money available to invest in productivity 
improvements, and higher competition spurs some lagging firms to work harder and improve 
productivity in order to survive. The balance of these two effects might work out differently in 
both sectors, for example, because the initial level of competition may differ. Some theory 
papers incorporate asymmetric effects of liberalisation in the productivity level of firms. If 
non-exporting firms become exporters, we may see a decline in mean industry productivity 
because new exporters may need time to adapt to the new environment. 
The difference in results across textile and garment firms is related to the structure of 
production, namely, the type of raw materials used by garment firms after the end of MFA. 
However, the data does not provide information about types of raw materials used and it is, 
therefore, hard to determine if this was the case. Another possible explanation is a change in 
product mix, for instance, a shift to the most productive production lines in textiles, 
and expansion into new products for which there is still some learning to do in the garment 
industry. Since  MFA expiration, Pakistan has been changing the composition of its textile 
exports, from a broader category that benefitted from the MFA without much weight of Rules 
of Origin (RoO), to a narrower category focused on specific markets that offer Pakistan 
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preferential access through bilateral trade agreements with strict Rules of Origin.  If this is the 
case, one would expect a fall in productivity as the mix of inputs utilised by firms would no 
longer be dictated by rationally choosing the optimal input-mix given market prices. If the 
composition of exports has changed in the stated way, one should attempt to decompose the 
TFP between RoO-affected and non-RoO-affected exports. Another aspect is that the country 
may have found it harder to compete with other countries in the garments sector because 
clothing is relatively more labour intensive than textiles; firms in Pakistan could have 
responded to, say, China’s competition by upgrading the quality of Pakistani textiles but may 
not have done so in the garment sector because it is harder to upgrade quality in that sector. 
These cross-sector differences in quality ladders could play a crucial role under these 
circumstances. 
 
4.4.  Robustness Check: Alternative Measure of Productivity 
This section provides an alternative measure of productivity to determine whether 
or not results derived so far are sensitive to empirical methodology used to estimate firm 
efficiency. The OP methodology can be used to account for simultaneity between input 
choices and productivity shocks, in addition to sample selection bias. Table 11 illustrates 
the estimation results when change in firm productivity is regressed on change in 
adjusted level of quotas using the OP productivity measure. We note that the results are 
not very different from LP regression estimates. As before, an increase in adjusted level 
of quotas brings about a significant reduction in the firm’s mean productivity in clothing 
industry but not in the textile sector. Moreover, the sign and magnitude of most of the 
control variables’ coefficients remain the same as under LP (see Table 11). 
 
Table 11 
Effect of Elimination of Quota-Restrictions on Textile and Clothing  
Firms’ Productivity—Olley and Pakes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Textile Clothing 
Adjusted Quota 1.087** 1.969*** 2.047*** –1.170*** –1.647*** –0.646 
 (0.539) (0.752) (0.727) (0.306) (0.353) (0.575) 
Cost of Imports (–1) –0.146 0.124 0.103 0.110 –4.953 –5.612 
 (0.238) (0.223) (0.225) (6.915) (10.55) (11.24) 
Herfindahl Index (–1) 0.110* 0.149* 0.162** –0.189 –0.186 –0.113 
 (0.0604) (0.0760) (0.0800) (0.153) (0.220) (0.224) 
Multinational 0.0807 0.0483 0.234 –2.523 –4.167 –3.935 
 (0.173) (0.139) (0.200) (2.181) (3.770) (3.583) 
ISO Certified 0.362** 0.767* 0.583 0.773 1.292 2.066* 
 (0.152) (0.460) (0.459) (0.618) (0.936) (1.087) 
K/L (–1) –0.198 –0.169* –0.187* 0.781 0.214 –0.00531 
 (0.122) (0.0912) (0.107) (0.486) (0.755) (0.777) 
Size (–1) –0.0156 –0.082*** –0.076*** 0.115* 0.108 0.0278 
 (0.0278) (0.0259) (0.0280) (0.0590) (0.0818) (0.0837) 
Age  –0.0244 –0.00227  3.653** 3.530* 
  (0.267) (0.281)  (1.841) (2.100) 
Age2  0.0282 0.0372  –0.822** –0.691 
  (0.0496) (0.0574)  (0.365) (0.484) 
Constant –17.73* 0 0 11.77* 20.57*** 0 
 (10.05) (0) (0) (6.369) (7.319) (0) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Effects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
No. of Observations 1567 996 996 502 315 315 
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. (–1) denotes lagged variables.              
*** Significant at, or below, 1 percent. ** Significant at, or below, 5 percent. * Significant at, or below, 10 percent. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The elimination of quotas has been the most important event in the global textile 
and garment industry in the past two decades. The textile sector is a key industry in 
Pakistan in terms of output, export value, foreign exchange earnings and employment. 
Along with the cost advantage in terms of proximity to a raw material base in cotton and 
man-made fibres, as well as the availability of cheap labour, what appears to be a crucial 
determinant of competitiveness in this industry is the ability to respond to rapidly 
changing consumer demands. This, in turn, requires greater investment in research and 
development to ensure greater mobility and adaptability of the production process to 
changes in fashion trends. Although the need to invest in cost-saving production methods 
is vital for the textile industry as well, it plays a greater role in the clothing industry 
owing to the nature of the finished good and its global price sensitivity. The sectoral 
heterogeneity in the effect of MFA expiration further corroborates this notion. The 
finding that mean productivity fell for the clothing firms as a result of the phasing out of 
quotas, points to the inability of these firms to shift to a more efficient composition of 
inputs as well as the product range of output produced in response to a more competitive 
world market. For example, according to a report by the World Bank’s Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, compared to its competitors, 
Pakistani garment industry labour is cheaper but the least productive: limited training in 
productivity, design, and other product related skills are the major constraints to raising 
productivity, and clothing firms have been unable to tailor products particularly for their 
customers, deliver fast and within multiple fashion cycles in one season [Pakistan Growth 
and Export Competitiveness (2006)]. Even though several institutions for training and 
skills upgradation are present, in general, the country has an insufficient number of 
institutes that offer support services to garment firms. According to the report, higher 
efficiency at the firm level is necessary in order to compensate for the time costs 
associated with greater distance to the U.S. market. APTMA has been seeking duty-free 
access to the U.S. market for a large number of finished items. If the duty-free facility is 
provided, Pakistan can increase its export tremendously. More recently, the textile and 
clothing industry has faced an acute energy crisis. Energy shortages are forcing the textile 
industry to operate at almost half the capacity. If continuous gas and power supply are not 
guaranteed to the textile firms, exporters would not succeed to complete their orders on 
time, threatening total disintegration of Pakistani textile exports. 
The most important contribution of this paper is that it is one of the few studies to 
empirically investigate the effect of liberalisation in the form of phasing out of quotas on 
firm-level productivity in the textile and clothing industry. The existing studies pertain to 
macroeconomic outcomes of the end of MFA, and do not consider the effect on textile 
firms. The studies that do attempt to evaluate the impact of lifting a quota at the firm 
level do not utilise the actual number of quotas imposed by developed countries on 
imports from developing countries. This paper, on the other hand, uses the database that 
traces U.S. trading partners’ exports to the U.S. along with the actual amount of quota 
under the regimes determined by the MFA. Because of the nature of data and empirical 
methodology used, it effectively takes care of the endogeneity problem that is often 
challenging for analyses to estimate the effect of liberalisation on firm performance. We 
observe that MFA expiration led to an increase in average productivity of textile 
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producing firms but a significant reduction in mean productivity of clothing and garment 
producers. The paper draws attention to cross-sector variation in the impact of MFA 
expiration and to trade reforms that often influence different sectors heterogeneously 
even within the manufacturing industry. It proposes various explanations for this 
outcome, for example, a change in product mix, entry by non-exporters in clothing sector, 
cross-sector differences in quality ladders, and so forth. 
The competitiveness of T&C industry hinges on numerous factors: labour cost, 
production costs (energy, water, production inputs, for example, cotton, polyester and 
chemicals), transport and distribution, and macroeconomic environment (domestic 
interest rates, corporate taxes, exchange rate, property rights, and political stability). The 
private sector in Pakistan appears to benefit from domestic raw material base in cotton 
and synthetic fibres, low labour costs, and large-scale investment in the last number of 
years. Clearly, the T&C industry has benefited from complimentary trade agreements 
with the US and EU since 2001 in relation to the fight against terrorism. The government 
is promoting diversification in terms of input use and products to lessen the concentration 
in low value-added products. It has been promoting progress in the weaving sector 
through implementation of standards and loan programmes to upgrade to auto looms. On 
the other hand, the industry faces the challenge of obsolete machinery, energy shortages 
and export concentration in low value-added products. The declining efficiency of 
clothing firms points to the failure of these firms to fight competition. MFA expiration is 
a chance for them to trim down their input usage which can help reduce export prices in 
the world market, yielding the desired competitive edge over other exporters. 
 
  





Sample OTEXA Categories—Adjusted Base, Imports and Fill Rates 
Year 
MFA 






(SME) Fill Rate 
1993 219 Duck Fabric M2 5500000 5500000 1 
1994 219 Duck Fabric M2 5885000 3983780 0.676938 
1995 219 Duck Fabric M2 5606114 2842510 0.507038 
1996 219 Duck Fabric M2 6818078 6058734 0.888628 
1997 219 Duck Fabric M2 8777010 8454310 0.963234 
1998 219 Duck Fabric M2 7200397 5611143 0.779283 
1999 219 Duck Fabric M2 7758895 3621719 0.466783 
2000 219 Duck Fabric M2 8736258 7030377 0.804736 
2001 219 Duck Fabric M2 1.08E+07 6753098 0.625608 
2002 219 Duck Fabric M2 1.16E+07 10054596 0.87003 
2003 219 Duck Fabric M2 1.30E+07 11025657 0.845117 
2004 219 Duck Fabric M2 1.67E+07 11393881 0.68291 
1993 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 3529200 3419602 0.968945 
1994 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 4750800 1882077 0.39616 
1995 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 3323319 1206620 0.363077 
1996 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 4958603 2935625 0.592027 
1997 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 6383279 6148264 0.963183 
1998 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 5577228 5577228 1 
1999 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 6944831 4895780 0.704953 
2000 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 6646990 6646990 1 
2001 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 9103492 9103492 1 
2002 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 9619245 9582178 0.996147 
2003 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 1.09E+07 10430209 0.960494 
2004 314 Cotton Poplin & Broadcloth Fabric M2 1.23E+07 9637755 0.786177 
1991 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 5.16E+07 51576942 1 
1992 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 5.44E+07 54413674 1 
1993 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 6.06E+07 56601311 0.933711 
1994 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 6.56E+07 63840951 0.973061 
1995 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 6.70E+07 62885763 0.938984 
1996 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 6.25E+07 48527274 0.77664 
1997 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 8.60E+07 80625620 0.937126 
1998 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 7.64E+07 76408847 1 
1999 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 7.11E+07 57271284 0.805458 
2000 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 7.52E+07 58815757 0.782006 
2001 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 8.67E+07 78064295 0.90072 
2002 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 1.17E+08 1.17E+08 1 
2003 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 1.14E+08 1.06E+08 0.927237 
2004 315 Cotton Print Cloth Fabric M2 1.47E+08 78932440 0.537423 
Source: US MFA/ATC Database [Brambilla, et al. (2007)]. 




Sample OTEXA Categories—Adjusted Base, Imports and Fill Rates (Continued) 
Year 
MFA 






(SME) Fill Rate 
1994 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 2.30E+07 17201696 0.7479 
1995 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 1.93E+07 12039372 0.622763 
1996 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 2.66E+07 19048809 0.714866 
1997 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 3.43E+07 34302672 1 
1998 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 2.99E+07 29901543 1 
1999 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 3.31E+07 21604068 0.652369 
2000 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 3.84E+07 32280324 0.840262 
2001 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 4.52E+07 33642099 0.744576 
2002 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 5.70E+07 55857219 0.979842 
2003 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 5.84E+07 56259003 0.964072 
2004 317/617 MMF Twill And Sateen Fabric M2 6.59E+07 56710278 0.860839 
1991 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 4149613 4149612.9 1 
1992 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 4298328 4298327.8 1 
1993 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 5225211 5225211.3 1 
1994 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 5947642 5925369.9 0.996255 
1995 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 6430591 6430590.5 1 
1996 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 7114654 7114654.1 1 
1997 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 7355412 7355412.1 1 
1998 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 7784920 7730324.1 0.992987 
1999 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 9120778 9120778.4 1 
2000 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 1.06E+07 10561745 1 
2001 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 1.06E+07 10267923 0.973166 
2002 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 2747715 1508812 0.549115 
2003 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 3962053 1456208.9 0.367539 
2004 331/631 Cotton & MMF Gloves & Mittens DPR 3716657 1421849.7 0.382561 
1992 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 6541200 6541200 1 
1993 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 7115729 5373409.5 0.755145 
1994 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 7426539 5997514.5 0.807579 
1995 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 9241412 6963307.5 0.75349 
1996 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 9362300 8715907.5 0.930958 
1997 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 9205704 7121214 0.773565 
1998 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 1.23E+07 10242740 0.829831 
1999 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 1.30E+07 13010882 1 
2000 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 1.33E+07 12151176 0.914748 
2001 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 2.14E+07 17412737 0.813117 
2002 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 2.42E+07 22245428 0.920172 
2003 334/634 Other M&B cotton and MMF coats DOZ 2.73E+07 26630447 0.975774 
1992 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 1.00E+07 9381917.6 0.935222 
1993 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 1.21E+07 8639039.7 0.715614 
1994 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 1.54E+07 11835526 0.770508 
1995 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 1.41E+07 13226721 0.939638 
1996 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 1.73E+07 15759919 0.912777 
1997 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 1.73E+07 16131567 0.933601 
1998 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 1.88E+07 17240824 0.915346 
1999 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 1.84E+07 7362984.6 0.399599 
2000 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 2.33E+07 19182251 0.823895 
2001 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 2.56E+07 17012590 0.665267 
2002 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 3.16E+07 26824559 0.847631 
2003 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 2.98E+07 21127582 0.708673 
2004 336/636 Cotton & MMF Dresses DOZ 4.11E+07 32319945 0.786017 
Source: US MFA/ATC Database [Brambilla, et al. (2007)]. 
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Table A.1 
Sample OTEXA Categories—Adjusted Base, Imports & Fill Rates (Continued) 
Year 
MFA 






(SME) Fill Rate 
1992 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 2.58E+07 25822104 1 
1993 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 2.45E+07 21908160 0.893081 
1994 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 2.79E+07 27890238 1 
1995 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 3.13E+07 31344468 1 
1996 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 3.17E+07 31693164 1 
1997 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 3.17E+07 31718982 1 
1998 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 3.41E+07 33052386 0.970578 
1999 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 3.68E+07 36774354 1 
2000 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 4.03E+07 40276782 1 
2001 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 4.44E+07 44392812 1 
2002 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 5.17E+07 51688488 1 
2003 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 5.64E+07 56447706 1 
2004 338 M&B Knit Shirts, Cotton DOZ 5.88E+07 58810998 1 
1992 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 5965572 5965572 1 
1993 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 6383160 5891052 0.922905 
1994 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 7121862 7121862 1 
1995 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 6753414 6753414 1 
1996 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 8352198 8352198 1 
1997 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 7526706 7440906 0.988601 
1998 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 9045354 8537808 0.943889 
1999 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 1.07E+07 10733376 1 
2000 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 1.22E+07 12219480 1 
2001 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 1.11E+07 10820190 0.972356 
2002 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 1.59E+07 14536554 0.91195 
2003 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 1.70E+07 16717866 0.982085 
2004 339 W&G Knit Shirts/Blouses, Cotton DOZ 1.80E+07 16278546 0.905849 
1994 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 2571174 1685279.4 0.655451 
1995 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 3619448 2781412.8 0.768463 
1996 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 4401907 2625439.6 0.596432 
1997 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 2780534 1119422.1 0.402593 
1998 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 1275127 1275127.1 1 
1999 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 5826571 2450260.3 0.420532 
2000 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 5640335 3453909.4 0.612359 
2001 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 7464006 3887454.7 0.520827 
2002 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 7867513 3826543.5 0.486373 
2003 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 8881696 2981951.9 0.335741 
2004 342/642 Cotton & MMF Skirts DOZ 1.13E+07 3799351 0.336536 
1992 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 8402825 8402825.2 1 
1993 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 8251858 8251858.4 1 
1994 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 1.08E+07 9960694.7 0.924569 
1995 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 1.16E+07 9468190.1 0.81285 
1996 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 1.26E+07 12137749 0.963777 
1997 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 1.36E+07 13165104 0.966842 
1998 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 1.50E+07 13742717 0.916263 
1999 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 1.65E+07 1621045.5 0.09812 
2000 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 1.91E+07 19057681 1 
2001 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 2.00E+07 19970932 1 
2002 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 2.42E+07 24176427 1 
2003 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 2.73E+07 27292881 1 
2004 347/348 Cotton Trousers/Slacks & Shorts DOZ 2.94E+07 29448628 1 
Source: US MFA/ATC Database [Brambilla, et al. (2007)]. 




Sample OTEXA Categories—Adjusted Base, Imports & Fill Rates (Continued) 
Year 
MFA 






(SME) Fill Rate 
1992 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 5277116 2973660 0.563501 
1993 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 9276158 8252167.5 0.889611 
1994 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 1.10E+07 9732690 0.883391 
1995 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 1.14E+07 9906820.5 0.872117 
1996 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 1.26E+07 11851097 0.938869 
1997 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 1.35E+07 13277810 0.985685 
1998 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 1.48E+07 14312109 0.964565 
1999 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 1.63E+07 15460640 0.945955 
2000 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 1.90E+07 19012371 1 
2001 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 1.99E+07 19932657 1 
2002 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 3.06E+07 26602512 0.86802 
2003 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 3.59E+07 35853266 1 
2004 351/651 Cotton & MMF Nightwear & Pajamas DOZ 4.05E+07 40474967 1 
1992 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 4645995 4255873.8 0.916031 
1993 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 6092056 4878458.6 0.80079 
1994 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 7180246 4580138.6 0.63788 
1995 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 7483515 7414257.7 0.990745 
1996 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 8091173 7608504.7 0.940346 
1997 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 8413573 7877422.1 0.936276 
1998 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 9970725 9210810.8 0.923786 
1999 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 9412245 8220331.9 0.873366 
2000 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 1.29E+07 12293112 0.953438 
2001 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 1.36E+07 13600364 1 
2002 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 1.72E+07 16746916 0.972925 
2003 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 2.02E+07 19128188 0.944741 
2004 352/652 Cotton & MMF Underwear etc. DOZ 2.29E+07 22856951 1 
1991 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 1391385 1391384.7 1 
1992 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 1659218 1574308.8 0.948826 
1993 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 1592996 1592996.4 1 
1994 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 1924688 1902252.6 0.988344 
1995 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 2080972 2073618.9 0.996467 
1996 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 3680633 3378957.3 0.918037 
1997 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 4413190 4187838.6 0.948937 
1998 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 4840267 4840266.6 1 
1999 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 5736731 5736731.4 1 
2000 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 6014405 6014404.8 1 
2001 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 6624866 6624865.8 1 
2002 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 7668605 7668604.8 1 
2003 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 9081286 9081286.2 1 
2004 360 Cotton Pillowcases NO 9454337 9454337.1 1 
1991 361 Cotton Sheets NO 1.15E+07 11460452 1 
1992 361 Cotton Sheets NO 1.30E+07 12950309 1 
1993 361 Cotton Sheets NO 1.24E+07 12433444 1 
1994 361 Cotton Sheets NO 1.45E+07 14460732 1 
1995 361 Cotton Sheets NO 1.56E+07 15634939 1 
1996 361 Cotton Sheets NO 2.29E+07 18597389 0.811838 
1997 361 Cotton Sheets NO 2.78E+07 25280960 0.909474 
1998 361 Cotton Sheets NO 3.44E+07 33095868 0.962913 
1999 361 Cotton Sheets NO 3.85E+07 38541344 1 
Source: US MFA/ATC Database [Brambilla, et al. (2007)]. 
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Table A.1 
Sample OTEXA Categories—Adjusted Base, Imports & Fill Rates (Continued) 
Year 
MFA 






(SME) Fill Rate 
2000 361 Cotton Sheets NO 4.04E+07 40406844 1 
2001 361 Cotton Sheets NO 4.45E+07 44508136 1 
2002 361 Cotton Sheets NO 5.01E+07 50126669 1 
2003 361 Cotton Sheets NO 5.62E+07 56164092 1 
2004 361 Cotton Sheets NO 6.01E+07 60097534 1 
1991 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 1.17E+07 11689698 1 
1992 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 1.47E+07 14710422 1 
1993 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 1.38E+07 13844720 1 
1994 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 1.54E+07 15357094 1 
1995 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 1.62E+07 16230249 0.998919 
1996 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 1.76E+07 17588729 1 
1997 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 1.86E+07 18594367 1 
1998 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 1.98E+07 19793857 1 
1999 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 2.10E+07 20999250 1 
2000 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 2.25E+07 22521696 1 
2001 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 2.42E+07 24154519 1 
2002 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 2.64E+07 26403174 1 
2003 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 2.88E+07 28834247 1 
2004 363 Cotton Terry & Other Pile Towels NO 2.97E+07 29271308 0.984514 
1991 369 Shop Towels Only KG 3688660 3688660 1 
1992 369 Shop Towels Only KG 4165145 4165144.5 1 
1993 369 Shop Towels Only KG 4456703 4456703 1 
1994 369 Shop Towels Only KG 4456703 4256052 0.954978 
1995 369 Shop Towels Only KG 5155888 4682446 0.908175 
1996 369 Shop Towels Only KG 5675884 5675883.5 1 
1997 369 Shop Towels Only KG 6144047 6144046.5 1 
1998 369 Shop Towels Only KG 6780552 6780552 1 
1999 369 Shop Towels Only KG 7363168 733167.5 0.099572 
2000 369 Shop Towels Only KG 8096709 8096709 1 
2001 369 Shop Towels Only KG 8918523 8918523 1 
2002 369 Shop Towels Only KG 1.01E+07 10080558 1 
2003 369 Shop Towels Only KG 1.14E+07 11379970 1 
2004 369 Shop Towels Only KG 1.21E+07 12131115 1 
1991 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 1.42E+07 14187864 1 
1992 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 1.49E+07 14935279 1 
1993 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 1.76E+07 13794085 0.78531 
1994 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 2.00E+07 13475023 0.673025 
1995 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 1.78E+07 10141540 0.569823 
1996 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 1.94E+07 14184923 0.730959 
1997 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 2.56E+07 22730616 0.889082 
1998 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 2.56E+07 25632933 1 
1999 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 2.87E+07 26963151 0.940312 
2000 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 2.83E+07 26330205 0.929341 
2001 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 3.79E+07 37853501 1 
2002 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 3.83E+07 36837156 0.962278 
2003 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 3.77E+07 27696697 0.735485 
2004 615 MMF Print Cloth Fabric M2 4.90E+07 25816627 0.527164 
Source: US MFA/ATC Database [Brambilla, et al. (2007)]. 




Sample OTEXA Categories—Adjusted Base, Imports & Fill Rates (Continued) 
Year 
MFA 






(SME) Fill Rate 
1991 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 1796113 626356.8 0.348729 
1992 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 981007.2 981007.2 1 
1993 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 1517175 1219419.4 0.803743 
1994 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 520253.3 520253.28 1 
1995 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 1429216 1429215.8 1 
1996 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 976212 976212 1 
1997 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 1228789 1228789.4 1 
1998 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 2448157 860764.32 0.351597 
1999 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 3260684 3252.96 0.000998 
2000 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 4240629 4240628.6 1 
2001 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 2368803 1903253.8 0.803467 
2002 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 4843048 3232677.6 0.667488 
2003 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 6378536 6378536.2 1 
2004 638/639 MMF KN Shirts & Blouses DOZ 8429119 6944680.8 0.823892 
1996 666 MMF Pillowcases ex. Bolsters KG 7456867 7456867.2 1 
1997 666 MMF Pillowcases ex. Bolsters KG 1.13E+07 11178763 0.991541 
1998 666 MMF Pillowcases ex. Bolsters KG 1.24E+07 12432586 1 
1999 666 MMF Pillowcases ex. Bolsters KG 1.47E+07 14678395 1 
2000 666 MMF Pillowcases ex. Bolsters KG 1.24E+07 12418099 1 
2001 666 MMF Pillowcases ex. Bolsters KG 1.70E+07 17020152 1 
2002 666 MMF Pillowcases ex. Bolsters KG 1.56E+07 15551554 1 
2003 666 MMF Pillowcases ex. Bolsters KG 1.85E+07 18517118 1 
2004 666 MMF Pillowcases ex. Bolsters KG 1.99E+07 19867450 1 
1996 666 MMF Sheets KG 3.43E+07 34322674 1 
1997 666 MMF sheets KG 5.74E+07 54240566 0.944143 
1998 666 MMF Sheets KG 6.68E+07 66772613 1 
1999 666 MMF Sheets KG 6.89E+07 68866315 1 
2000 666 MMF Sheets KG 7.72E+07 77178125 1 
2001 666 MMF Sheets KG 7.25E+07 72539179 1 
2002 666 MMF Sheets KG 8.94E+07 89401234 1 
2003 666 MMF Sheets KG 9.80E+07 98031859 1 
2004 666 MMF Sheets KG 1.02E+08 1.02E+08 1 




REVIEW OF OLLEY AND PAKES AND LEVINSOHN AND PETRIN 
This section provides a review of the techniques of Olley and Pakes and Levinsohn 
and Petrin. Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
                              … … … … (B.1) 
    is the log of output,     is the log of capital input, and     is the log of labour input. 
The OP methodology allows the error term to have two components, a white noise 
component and a time-varying productivity shock. There are two terms in this equation 
that are unobservable to the econometrician,     and    .     represents shocks that are not 
observable by firms before making their input decisions. On the contrary,     represents 
shocks that are potentially expected by firms when they make input decisions.     can 
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also represent measurement error in the output variable. We will refer to     as the 
‘productivity shock’ of firm i in period t [Ackerberg, et al. (2005)]. It is assumed that     
follows a first order Markov process and capital is accumulated by means of a 
deterministic dynamic investment process: 
       |              |    , 
where     is firm i’s information set at t. Current and past realisations of  , i.e. (   , ..., 
   ) are assumed to be a part of    . OP assumes that labour is a non-dynamic input. This 
investment adds to future capital stock deterministically: 
                     
In view of the fact that     is decided at t−1, the above assumptions entail that it 
must be uncorrelated with the unexpected innovation in     between t−1 and t. This 
orthogonality will be used to form a moment to spot   . Unlike capital,     is decided at t 
and, consequently, correlated with the innovation component of    . Considering the firm’s 
dynamic decision of investment level,    , OP state conditions under which a firm’s optimal 
investment level is strictly an increasing function of their current productivity,    , i.e. 
                   … … … … … … (B.2) 
Profit maximisation generates an investment demand function that is determined by 
two state variables, capital and productivity. The reason f is indexed by t is the assumption 
that variables such as input prices, are allowed to vary across time but not across firms 
[Ackerberg, et al. (2006)]. If the investment demand function is monotonically increasing in 
productivity, it is feasible to invert the investment function and get an expression for 
productivity as a function of capital and investment [Pakes (1994)]: 
        
              … … … … … … (B.3) 
The heart of OP is to make use of this inverse function to control for     in the 
production function: 
                    
                 … … … … (B.4) 
The first stage of OP is to estimate this equation. f is the solution to a complex 
dynamic programming problem. To avoid the computationally demanding assumptions, 
OP treats   
   non-parametrically [Ackerberg, et al. (2006)]. Given this non-parametric 
treatment, direct estimation of (B.4) does not identify   , as     is collinear with the non-
parametric function. Nevertheless, one does find an estimate of the labour coefficient   , 
and of the composite term          
  (   ,   ), which we denote by  ̂  . By the timing 
assumptions regarding capital, we can write: 
     [    |     ]        [    |     ]     , 
where     is orthogonal to    , i.e.  [    |   ]   . This is the moment which OP 
uses to identify the capital coefficient. To operationalise this process by GMM, given a 
guess at the capital coefficient   , one can ‘invert’ out the    ’s in all periods: 
          ̂        . 
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Given these        ’s, one can compute    ’s in all periods by non-parametrically 
regressing        ’s on          ’s and taking the residual, i.e. 
                  ̂           , 
where  ̂            are predicted values from the non-parametric regression. Treating 
the regression of     on       non-parametrically allows for     to follow an arbitrary 






∑ ∑                
In a GMM procedure,    would be estimated by setting this empirical analogue as 
close as possible to zero [Ackerberg, et al. (2005)]. LP adopts a similar approach to 
solving the endogeneity problem. Instead of using an investment demand equation, they 
use an intermediate input demand function to invert out    . In the real data, investment 
is often lumpy. This may not be in line with the strict monotonicity assumption regarding 
investment. Also, OP procedure can cause efficiency loss in a data with zero investment. 
Given that the intermediate input demands normally exhibit a lesser tendency to have 
zeros, the strict monotonicity condition is expected to hold in the LP methodology. LP 
considers the following production function: 
                                 
where     is an intermediate input, such as electricity. LP considers the following 
intermediate input demand function: 
                  … … … … … … (B.5) 
First, the intermediate input at t is chosen as a function of      Secondly,     is also 
taken to be a ‘perfectly variable’ input. If     was chosen before    , then it would 
influence the firm’s optimal choice of    . Under the assumption that intermediate input 
demand (B.5) is monotonic in    , we can invert: 
        
             … … … … … … (B.6) 
And substitute this in the production function to get: 
                          
                 … … … (B.7) 
The first step of the LP estimates    using the above equation, treating   
   non-
parametrically. Once more,    and    are not identified as     and    are collinear with the 
non-parametric term. One also obtains an estimate of the composite term, in this case 
               
  (   ,   ). In the second stage, there is one more parameter to estimate, 
  . LP uses the same moment condition as OP to identify the capital coefficient [Ackerberg, 
et al. (2005)].            can be constructed as the residual from a non-parametric regression 
of              ̂                on (               ̂             
       )  They include a further moment to identify   , i.e. the condition that            
is orthogonal to     . This results in the following moment condition: 
  [          | 
   
     
 ]    
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    is not orthogonal to     because     is observed at the time that     is chosen, and     
should be uncorrelated with     , as      was chosen at t–1 [Ackerberg, et al. (2006)]. 
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